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STUDENT NOTE

Government Secrets, National Security and Freedom of the
Press: The Ability of the United States to Prosecute Julian
Assange
Heather M. Lacey*
ABSTRACT
Julian Assange has gained worldwide fame and notoriety through his role
as founder and spokesperson for the whistle‐blowing news organization,
WikiLeaks. Throughout its existence, WikiLeaks has exposed thousands of
classified documents and intelligence related to the national security of the
United States and countries throughout the world. Some “leaks” of classified
information attributed to WikiLeaks include the publication of thousands of
State Department diplomatic cables, the disclosure of classified military
documents regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the release of what
have become known as the “Guantanamo Files,” a series of classified documents
detailing the inner workings of Guantanamo Bay Detention Center. Currently,
the Department of Justice is building a criminal case in order to prosecute
Assange for the release and publication of classified national security
information through the WikiLeaks website.
This article discusses the most foreseeable substantive and procedural
difficulties in the potential United States prosecution of Julian Assange.
Substantively, the criminal theory upon which the Department of Justice will
choose to prosecute Assange is unclear. Legal scholars have speculated that the
Federal Espionage Act, which is discussed in detail throughout this article,
provides the most viable routes for prosecution of national security leaks. As
there is no direct precedent for such a prosecution, this article proceeds by
analyzing two cases of foreseeable importance to an Assange prosecution under
the Espionage Act: New York Times Company v. United States and United States
v. Rosen. The New York Times case, better known Pentagon Papers case, is
significant in that it suggests through dicta that it is possible for the press to be
prosecuted under the Espionage Act for the publication of classified national
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. Political Science,
2009, University of Miami. Symposium Editor of the University of Miami National
Security & Armed Conflict Law Review.
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security material. The Rosen case, which represents the first time that a civilian
has been prosecuted for a national security leak under the Espionage Act, is
important in that the ruling of Judge Ellis establishes significant procedural
barriers for an Espionage Act prosecution—most notably the imposition of the
“bad faith” requirement. Procedurally, the United States will face difficulty in the
process of extraditing Assange to the United States for a criminal prosecution.
This article analyzes in depth the potential avenues for extradition, as well as
statutory requirements and exceptions, such as the dual criminality requirement
and the political offense exception.
Ultimately, the United States Congress will need to establish new policies
addressing this matter, as there is currently no statutory framework equipped to
handle the global dissemination of classified national security information
through the World Wide Web.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Journalist, hacker, rapist, whistleblower, traitor, hero, anarchist, spy and
criminal. These are just some of the expressions that have been used to describe
Julian Assange, founder of the worldwide whistle‐blowing news organization,
WikiLeaks.1 WikiLeaks is a non‐profit media organization that is dedicated to
exposing secret information about governments and corporations.2 Wikileaks
was founded by Assange, as well as numerous other computer experts and
political activists, in 2006.3 The WikiLeaks website is unique in that it functions as
a combination between a user‐based informational website, such as Wikipedia,4
in which readers are able to actively participate in providing, changing and
enhancing the content of the site, and a news organization. WikiLeaks describes
itself as:
A non‐profit media organization dedicated to bringing important news
and information to the public. We provide an innovative, secure and
anonymous way for independent sources around the world to leak
information to our journalists. We publish material of ethical, political
and historical significance while keeping the identity of our sources
anonymous, thus providing a universal way for the revealing of
suppressed and censored injustices.5

The message of WikiLeaks is clear, and the aim is global.6 The website
further details the mission statement of the organization, stating: “We are of
assistance to peoples of all countries who wish to reveal unethical behavior in
their governments and institutions. We aim for maximum political impact.”7
Since its inception, WikiLeaks has published itself, or has handed over to
larger news organizations, such as the New York Times and the Guardian, a
significant amount of classified information that has caught the attention of the
United States government.8 Some “leaks” of classified information attributed to
WikiLeaks include the publication of thousands of State Department diplomatic

1

See generally WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks.org (last visited June 17, 2011).
See Wikileaks, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited June, 17, 2011).
3
See Joby Warrick, Exposing Secrets through Secrecy; Cloaked in the Virtual World,
Wikileaks Gives Whistleblowers a Powerful Platform, WASH. POST, May 20, 2010, at A01.
4
See generally Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited June 17, 2011).
5
WikiLeaks, supra note 1.
6
See generally WikiLeaks, supra note 1.
7
WikiLeaks, http://mirror.Wikileaks.info/, (last visited Apr. 05, 2011).
8
See e.g. Baruch Weiss, Prosecuting WikiLeaks? Good Luck., WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at
B02; see also Burns and Ravi Somaiya, WikiLeaks Founder Is Jailed in Britain in Swedish
Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2010, at A1, col. 3.
2
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cables,9 the disclosure of classified military documents regarding the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan,10 and the release of what have become known as the
“Guantanamo Files,”11 a series of classified documents detailing the inner
workings of Guantanamo Bay Detention Center.
How does one, then, identify and describe the intent and rationale of
Julian Assange and his actions? The speculation is endless, and the debates are
heated. Is he a journalistic genius who has informed citizens around the globe as
to what their governments are really doing? Is he an anarchist, intent on single‐
handedly exposing government corruption and thereby destroying faith in
institutions and democracy? Is he a criminal, actively encouraging and enabling
people around the globe to steal and leak classified information about their
governments and militaries? This article seeks to identify some of the most
significant issues that the United States will face in its attempt to classify Julian
Assange as a criminal under the current U.S. criminal code, and successfully
prosecute him in American courts.
Despite the denouncement of the WikiLeaks initiative by many
governments around the world,12 there has been a substantial amount of praise
for WikiLeaks’ method of “journalism,” as Assange and his efforts have received
awards and commendations from various organizations around the globe.13 The
WikiLeaks website proudly displays a quote from an article in TIME Magazine,
stating that the WikiLeaks website “could become as important of a journalistic
tool as the Freedom of Information Act.”14 In 2009 Julian Assange won the
9

See generally State’s Secrets, A cache of diplomatic cables provides a chronicle of the
United States’ relations with the world, N.Y. TIMES, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/statessecrets.html#.
10
See generally The War Logs, An archive of classified military documents offers views of
the
wars
in
Iraq
and
Afghanistan,
N.Y.
TIMES,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/war‐logs.html.
11
See generally The Guantanamo Files, Articles based on a huge trove of secret
documents leaked to the anti‐secrecy organization WikiLeaks and made available to The
New York Times by another source on the condition of anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/guantanamo‐files/; See also The Guantanamo Files, A
Statement by the United States Government, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/guantanamo‐files‐us‐government‐
statement.html.
12
See e.g. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the leaks as “‘an attack on
America’ responsible for ‘endangering innocent people’ and ‘sabotaging the peaceful
relations between nations.’” Weiss, supra note 8.
13
See generally Wikileaks, supra note 2.
14
Tracy Samantha, A Wiki for Whistle‐Blowers, TIME MAG., Jan. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1581189,00.html; see also Wikileaks,
http://wikileaks.org/ (last visited June 17, 2011).
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Amnesty International New Media Award, which was presented to Assange in
appreciation of his work exposing extrajudicial killings in Kenya.15 Additionally,
Assange was awarded the Freedom of Expression Award for New Media in
2008,16 and, in 2010, he was a runner‐up for TIME Magazine’s person of the
year.17 Some supporters have even nominated Assange for the Nobel Peace
Prize.18
Regardless of the journalistic praise that Assange has received, it is easy
to understand why many of the documents being published by WikiLeaks are
ones in which the United States asserts are detrimental to national security, as
such documents hold the potential to destroy international diplomatic relations,
and endanger the lives of U.S. soldiers overseas through exposing military plans.
However, thus far, the United States has not charged Assange with a criminal
violation.19 During a press conference in December of 2010, United States
Attorney General Eric Holder stated that the Department of Justice is engaging in
a “very serious, active, ongoing investigation that is criminal in nature” into the
WikiLeaks releases.20
The criminal theory that the United States is likely to use in the
prosecution of Julian Assange is unclear; therefore all that can be accomplished
in the meantime is an analysis of the statutes and precedents that will likely
govern the efforts of the Department of Justice. This article seeks to illuminate
both the procedural and substantive difficulties that the United States
government will face in their on‐going efforts to build a criminal case against
Julian Assange. First, this article introduces and discusses the nuances of a
potential prosecution under the Federal Espionage Act.21 This is accomplished
15

Amnesty International Media Awards 2009, Winners and Shortlist, available at
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_20539.pdf; see also Wikileaks,
supra note 2.
16
Winners of Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Awards Announced, available
at
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2008/04/winners‐of‐index‐on‐censorship‐
freedom‐of‐expression‐award‐announced/.
17
Barton Gelman, Person of the Year 2010, TIME MAG., Dec. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2036683_2037118_2037
146,00.html
18
John F. Burns and Ravi Somaiya, WikiLeaks Founder In Court to Fight Extradition Effort,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, at A9.
19
The United States has not yet charged Julian Assange with a criminal violation, yet
there have been legal steps taken that are indicative of a pending criminal prosecution.
For example, the United States has subpoenaed Assange’s Twitter account as part of
their investigation. See Ravi Somaiya, British Court Grants Sweden’s Request for
Extradition of the Founder of WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, at A4.
20
Burns and Somaiya, supra note 8.
21
18 U.S.C.A. § 792 et seq. (West).
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through a discussion of the statutory text, followed by an analysis and
application of two prosecutions under the Espionage Act that are of foreseeable
importance: New York Times Company v. United States,22 better known as the
“Pentagon Papers” case, and United States v. Rosen.23 This article provides an in‐
depth analysis of these two cases, and illuminates the ways in which these cases
may aid or impair the efforts of the United States in prosecuting Assange under
the Espionage Act. Finally, the procedural difficulties of a potential criminal
prosecution of Assange in the United States are discussed, with a focus on
extradition procedures and possibilities.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES TO PROSECUTION
The theory under which the United States will build a criminal case
against Assange is uncertain. What is clear is that is there is no legislation that
directly addresses a situation like the one at hand, where classified government
documents are made available to the world instantaneously via the World Wide
Web. It is likely that Congress will create new legislation that is better able to
address national security leaks during this age of growing technology and global
dependence on the Internet. In the meantime, the United States must prosecute
Assange under an existing criminal statute, as the use of an ex post facto law24 is
violative of the U.S. Constitution.25 The success of the United States’ efforts is
heavily dependent on the ability of the Department of Justice to gather evidence
about WikiLeaks and its operations, as there are several federal criminal statutes
that could be utilized in the efforts to prosecute Assange.26 Potential theories of
liability for Assange include conspiracy and trafficking in stolen government
property.27 However, legal scholars are focusing their speculation on a
prosecution under the Federal Espionage Act, which appears to hold the most

22

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822
(1971).
23
United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006) amended, 1:05CR225,
2006 WL 5049154 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2006) and aff'd, 557 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
24
An “ex post facto law” is defined as “A law that impermissibly applies retroactively,
esp. in a way that negatively affects a person's rights, as by criminalizing an action that
was legal when it was committed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
25
U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 3 (“No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).
26
See Charlie Savage, U.S. Prosecutors Study WikiLeaks Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/world/08leak.html?_r=2&hp.
27
See id.; see also Pete Williams, The U.S. Legal Options against WikiLeaks, Julian
Assange,
NBC
NEWS,
Dec.
7,
2010,
available
at
http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/12/07/5606939‐the‐uss‐legal‐options‐
against‐WikiLeaks‐julian‐assange?commentId=19984478.
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viable routes for prosecutions relating to national security leaks.28 However, a
prosecution of Assange under the Espionage Act will be challenging, as there has
yet to be a successful prosecution under the Espionage Act that is comparable to
the case at hand.29
A. The Federal Espionage Act
The Federal Espionage Act of 191730 was enacted during World War I
with the stated purpose of the prevention of espionage and protection of
military secrets.31 Over the past 94 years, the original formulation of the
Espionage Act has been amended and transferred32 several times, with the
current formulation of the Espionage Act codified in Title 18 of the United States
Code Annotated, in Chapter 37, Espionage and Censorship.33 There are three
sections of the Act of potential importance to the potential United States’
prosecution of Assange: Section 793, titled “Gathering, transmitting or losing
defense information,”34 Section 794, titled “Gathering or delivering defense
information to aid foreign government,”35 and Section 798, titled “Disclosure of
classified information.”36
There are two major, foreseeable substantive difficulties facing the
Department of Justice in an attempt to prosecute Julian Assange under the
Espionage Act. The first challenge comes from the extensive protections
regarding freedom of speech and freedom of the press that are afforded by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.37 Second, the Department of
Justice must establish the element of “intent,” meaning it must be established
that Assange intended to harm the United States by publishing the classified
information.38

28

See Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks Founder, but Legal Scholars
Warn
of
Steep
Hurdles,
Dec.
1,
2010,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/world/02legal.html.
29
Id.
30
June 15, 1917, c 30, Title I, 40 Stat 217, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 31 et seq, 11 FCA title 50, §§ 31
et seq.
31
Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery
Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 336 (2003).
32
50 U.S.C.A. § 40 (West).
33
18 U.S.C.A. Pt. I, Ch. 37, Refs & Annos.
34
Id. § 793 (West).
35
Id. § 794 (West).
36
Id. § 798 (West).
37
See New York Times, 403 U.S. 713.
38
See Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602.
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B. The Pentagon Papers Precedent

In June of 1967, the United States Secretary of Defense, Robert S.
McNamara, commissioned a classified study that would provide an
“encyclopedic history” of the United States involvement with the Vietnam War,
which is now known as the Pentagon Papers study.39 Daniel Ellsberg, an
American citizen, had a long history of working in military intelligence: he had
worked as an employee of the RAND Corporation, the Pentagon, as a consultant
for the White House, and as an advisor to high‐ranking Pentagon and State
Department officials.40 Due to his extensive defense intelligence experience,
Ellsberg became one of the researchers for the Pentagon Papers study that was
commissioned by McNamara.41 After the completion of the 7,000 page classified
study, Ellsberg was given permission to read the study in its entirety.42 After
Ellsberg read the entire Pentagon Papers report, he became convinced that the
policy of the United States in Vietnam was futile, and that releasing the classified
Pentagon Papers study to the public may be able to “change the political
calculus” by holding President Nixon accountable, and preventing more
casualties from occurring in Vietnam.43 After much contemplation, including
legal consultation, Ellsberg decided that he would steal and leak the classified
study to the public.44 Ellsberg solicited the help of Anthony Russo, his friend from
the RAND Corporation who also opposed the war, and began the long process of
secretly photocopying the classified Pentagon Papers study.45 Ellsberg and Russo
then distributed the copies of the study to the New York Times and the
Washington Post.46 Both newspapers published a series of articles exposing the
contents of the Pentagon Papers study.47
After the publication of the Pentagon Papers in the Times and the Post,
the United States took legal action seeking to enjoin the newspapers from
publishing the study.48 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
39

DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE,
15‐20 (University of California Press, 1996).
40
Id. at 42.
41
Id. at 37.
42
Id. at 39–40.
43
Id. at 41–42.
44
Id. at 42–43.
45
Id. at 42.
46
Id. at 47; 127–128.
47
Id. at 129.
48
“On June 12, June 13 and June 14, 1971 The New York Times published summaries
and portions of the text of two documents— certain volumes from a 1968 Pentagon
study relating to Vietnam and a summary of a 1965 Defense Department study relating
to the Tonkin Gulf incident. The United States sues to enjoin the Times from ‘further
dissemination, disclosure or divulgence’ of materials contained in the 1968 study of the
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denial of the preliminary injunction to restrain the publication of classified
materials by the Washington Post49; while the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit remanded the decision of the Southern District of New York50 to
determine whether the disclosure of the study would “pose such grave and
immediate danger to the security of the United States as to warrant their
publication being enjoined.”51
1. The Per Curiam Opinion
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari for the
consolidated appeals regarding both the New York Times and the Washington
Post.52 The decision of the Court was per curiam, with separate concurring
opinions written by Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and
Marshall.53 Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Harlan and Blackmun
dissented.54 In the opinion, the Court stated that “‘[a]ny system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity,’”55 therefore the government bears “a heavy burden of
showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.”56 The Court
ultimately held that the government had not met its burden of showing
justification of restraint on publication of the contents of the study, and thereby
allowed the Pentagon Papers to be published.57
2. The Supreme Court Dicta
The decision of the Supreme Court in New York Times v. United States
represents a significant assertion of broad First Amendment protections that are
guaranteed to the press in the United States. This holding, however, came with a
few grave warnings as to the potential criminal liability of the press for the
decision making process with respect to Vietnam and the summary of the 1965 Tonkin
Gulf study.” United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
49
United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971) aff'd sub
nom. New York Times, 403 U.S. 713.
50
New York Times, 328 F. Supp. 324 (The motion for preliminary injunction was denied,
as the court found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the publication of
the documents in question would seriously breach national security.).
51
United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544, 544 (2d Cir. 1971) rev'd, 403 U.S.
713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971).
52
New York Times, 403 U.S. 713.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 714 (per curiam) quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct.
631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 713.
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publication of classified documents. The decision of the Court concerned only
the injunction for publication of the Pentagon Papers, yet all of the Justices
discussed in dicta58 the ability of the United States to prosecute the press for
publication of classified documents in general.59 This Supreme Court dictum is
fragmented, but nevertheless demonstrates that a majority of the Court felt that
the newspapers could be held criminally liable for such actions.60
Only two Supreme Court Justices, Justice Douglas and Justice Black, found
that there were no circumstances under which the press could be restrained or
held liable for the material that it publishes.61 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Black described how the decision of the Court was rooted in the First
Amendment of the Constitution.62 Justice Black wrote that “[b]oth the history
and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be
left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions,
or prior restraints.”63 Regarding the classified nature of the documents that were
published in the Pentagon Papers case, Justice Black further states that “[i]n
revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the
newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they
would do.”64
Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black joins concurring, writes that not
only is there “no room for governmental restraint on the press,” but there is also
“no statute barring the publication by the press of the material which the Times
and Post seek to use.”65 Justice Douglas specifically eliminates the application of
Section 793 of the Espionage Act to the press, as he finds that throughout the
statutory text of the Espionage Act, Congress specifically distinguished between
the use of the word “publish” and the word “communicate.”66 This is significant,
as Section 793 criminalizes only those who “willfully communicate” classified
information, therefore those who publish information do not fall under the
58

“Judicial dictum” is defined as “An opinion by a court on a question that is directly
involved, briefed, and argued by counsel, and even passed on by the court, but that is
not essential to the decision.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
59
See New York Times, 403 U.S. 713.
60
The majority of the Court suggests that a criminal prosecution could be possible under
various provisions of the United States Criminal Code. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at
724–762. The sections that the Court refers to have now been codified to include the
Espionage Act of 1917. See supra at note 33.
61
New York Times, 403 U.S. at 720–725 (Douglas, J., with whom Black, J. joins,
concurring).
62
See id. at 714–718 (Black, J., concurring); See also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
63
Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 720.
66
Id. at 720–721.
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scope of liability.67 Justice Douglas further discusses the inapplicability of Section
793 to the press by citing a version of Section 793 that had been proposed but
ultimately rejected during Senate ratification debates.68 The proposed version
would have allowed for the President to prohibit publication of “any information
relating to the national defense” during a time of war.69 Justice Douglas
concluded that as Congress ultimately rejected this proposed version of Section
793, it could not be found that Congress intended to impose this type of
limitation or liability on the press for the information that it publishes.
However, the remaining seven Supreme Court Justices each found that
there are some circumstances in which the government may be able to
criminally prosecute the press for publication of specified information.70 Justice
White, who wrote a concurring opinion, outlined the circumstances in which a
criminal prosecution of the press may be warranted.71 Justice White argued that
if Congress has enacted a law that encompasses the actions of the press, or if
there is a relevant section of the criminal code, the press can be held criminally
liable for publication regardless of First Amendment protections.72 Justice White
directly refuted the arguments of Justice Douglas, finding that although Congress
rejected a version of Section 793 that would have given the Executive authority
to proscribe the publication of defense‐related information in a time of war, the
same members of Congress also argued that “newspapers would be subject to
criminal prosecution if they insisted on publishing information of the type
Congress had itself determined should not be revealed.”73 Justice White also
directly referenced three sections of the Espionage Act—Section 793,74 Section
79775 and Section 798,76 which, according to the recorded Congressional intent,
67

“Whoever having any unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any
document, writing . . . or information relating to the national defense which information
the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United states or to
the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates . . . the same to any person
not entitled to receive it . . . (s)hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. §793(e) (emphasis added).
68
New York Times, 403 U.S. at 721–722.
69
The proposed and rejected version of §793 read, “‘During any national emergency
resulting from a war to which the United States is a party, or from threat of such a war,
the President may, by proclamation, prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the
attempting to publish or communicate any information relating to the national defense
which, in his judgment, is of such character that it is or might be useful to the enemy.’”
Id. at 721–722.
70
See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 724–762.
71
Id. at 730–740.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 733–734 (White, J., concurring).
74
Id. at 737 n.8.
75
Id. at 735 n.5.
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could and should be applicable to the press for the publication of classified
information.77
Therefore, due to the strong assertion of First Amendment protections
that this case represents, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to
enjoin or restrain the operations of WikiLeaks. However, applying the dictum of
the majority in New York Times v. United States to the WikiLeaks case, it appears
possible for WikiLeaks, and thereby Assange as cofounder, to be criminally
prosecuted under the Espionage Act.78 This is possible as long as the court finds
that the WikiLeaks website functions as a media outlet (or “the press”), such as
the New York Times or the Washington Post, and that the actions of WikiLeaks
fall within the statutory language of the Espionage Act. However, it is important
to know that there has never been a successful prosecution of the press under
the Espionage Act.79 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court dictum in New York Times
v. United States provides at least theoretical legal support for such a
prosecution, which may aid in the efforts of the Department of Justice.
In the aftermath of the decision of the Supreme Court in New York Times
v. United States, the government chose not to pursue espionage charges against
the New York Times or the Washington Post, even though the majority of the
Justices suggested that such a prosecution might be successful. Instead, the
government chose to criminally prosecute Russo and Ellsberg, as the sources of
the “leaked” Pentagon Papers.80 Russo and Ellsberg were indicted on charges of
“conspiracy, theft of government property, and espionage in connection with
the release of papers to the press.”81 Ultimately, the criminal case against
Ellsberg and Russo was dismissed due to government misconduct.82 Due to the
76

Id. at 735 n.7.
Id. at n.7–8.
78
The dicta of the majority of Justices in New York Times v. United States indicate that it
is theoretically possible, for the press to be criminally prosecuted for the publication of
classified information. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 724–762.
79
Floyd Abrams, Why WikiLeaks is unlike the Pentagon Papers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29,
2010,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204527804576044020396601528.htm
l; See also Weiss, supra note 8. (“The U.S. government has never successfully prosecuted
a media entity for a leak. It is typically much easier to bring such cases against the
government officials who do the leaking, because they sign nondisclosure agreements
surrendering many of the legal protections they otherwise would enjoy.”).
80
Rudenstine, supra note 39, at 339.
81
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1972, at Page 22, Column 3 (“Ellsberg and Russo have been
indicted on charges of conspiracy, theft of government property and espionage in
connection with release of papers to press.”).
82
The suit was dismissed because of governmental misconduct. United States v. Russo &
Ellsberg, Crim. No. 9373 (C.D.Cal. dismissed May 11, 1973). Russo and Ellsberg later
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dismissal of the Espionage charges against Ellsberg and Russo, the Pentagon
Papers case leaves no established precedent indicating what may happen to
Assange if he were personally prosecuted under the same statutory provisions,
further enhancing the challenges that the United States will face in a successful
prosecution under the Espionage Act.
3. The WikiLeaks Comparison
It is undisputed that the WikiLeaks case differs from the Pentagon Papers
case in numerous ways. However, there are two important differences between
the New York Times, the Washington Post, and WikiLeaks, which create
foreseeable points of contention if WikiLeaks was criminally prosecuted. First,
there is a significant temporal component, as the method by which WikiLeaks
“publishes” classified documents is markedly different from the ways in which
the New York Times and the Washington Post published the classified study on
Vietnam.83 WikiLeaks uses the World Wide Web, while the Times and the Post
were only able to use printed newspapers to disseminate the classified
information. This drastic change in technology and methodology of publication
would appear to drive a temporal aspect in prosecution, as classified and
potentially damaging information can be spread much more quickly.84 Another
important temporal component stems from the fact that some of the
information published on the WikiLeaks website affects the immediate state of
national security and diplomacy for the United States, and other countries
around the world,85 which provides further impetus for a timely prosecution.
Second, the purpose or intent of WikiLeaks behind the publication of
classified documents may differ from the intent of other conventional news
sources, such as the Times or the Post. For example, in the Pentagon Papers
case, the New York Times reviewed the Pentagon papers for months before
publishing any of the classified information.86 On the other hand, WikiLeaks
publishes information received almost immediately, which is clear from the goals
and the mission statement87 of the WikiLeaks organization. This seems to
indicate a significant difference in intent and purpose behind publication
between WikiLeaks and other conventional news sources, as it could be
brought a constitutional tort action seeking compensation for the injuries sustained
through their exposure to warrantless electronic surveillance. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 807
F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
83
Rudenstine, supra note 39, at 129.
84
See generally WikiLeaks, supra notes 1–2.
85
See Weiss, supra note 8.
86
“The New York Times clandestinely devoted a period of three months to examining
the 47 volumes that came into its unauthorized possession” before publication. New
York Times, 403 U.S. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87
See WikiLeaks, supra note 5.
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interpreted that “[WikiLeaks] revels in the revelation of ‘secrets’ simply because
they are secret.”88 This point provides a segway into the next substantive
difficulty that the United States will face in successfully prosecuting Assange
under the Espionage Act—the establishment of the element of intent.
C. United States v. Rosen: The Element of Intent
Although the federal Espionage Act originated from the World War I era,
this Act is still used successfully in prosecuting government agents who leak
information from the United States to other governments around the world.89
The difficulty arises in the application of the 1917 Espionage Act to non‐
government actors who distribute classified information for a reason other than
for the said intent of harming the U.S. government.90 This problem is highlighted
in a recent case, United States v. Rosen,91 which represents the first instance in
which the government attempted to criminally prosecute civilians (non‐
government employees) under the 1917 Espionage Act. The defendants, Steven
Rosen and Keith Weissman, were employees of a pro‐Israeli lobbying
organization, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), located in
Washington D.C.92 Rosen and Weissman were part of an alleged conspiracy in
which the defendants fostered relationships with government employees (most
notably Department of Defense employee Lawrence Franklin), obtained
classified information from these employees, and then leaked this information to
the press (a reporter for the Washington Post).93 The information allegedly
leaked to the media by Rosen and Weissman consisted of mostly intelligence
information relating to the United States’ diplomatic and military strategies in
Middle Eastern nations.94 Rosen and Weissman were federally indicted for
charges citing various sections of the Espionage Act, including “conspiring to
transmit information relating to the national defense to those not entitled to
receive it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793(g)”95 and “aiding and abetting the
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Abrams, supra note 79.
Gilead Light, The WikiLeaks Story and Criminal Liability Under the Espionage Laws,
2010 WL 3766819 (WJCOMPI), 2.
90
Id.
91
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602.
92
Id. at 607–08.
93
Id. at 608–10.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 607; See also 18 U.S.C. §793(g) (“If two or more persons conspire to violate any
of the forgoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be
subject to punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such
conspiracy.”).
89
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transmission of information relating to the national defense to one not entitled
to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793(d).”96
In May of 2009, four years after the indictment, the United States
dropped all charges against Rosen and Weissman.97 The Government dropped
the charges because they foresaw procedural difficulties during litigation, mostly
attributed to Judge Ellis’ imposition of additional requirements in order for the
government to obtain a conviction under the Espionage Act,98 including the
possibility of further revealing information that could be detrimental to national
security during the course of the trial.99
1. The Ruling of Judge Ellis
The importance of the United States v. Rosen to the potential U.S.
prosecution of Julian Assange lies not within the disposition of the case, but
instead in the ruling of Judge Ellis regarding the elements of intent and “bad
faith” needed for a conviction under the Espionage Act.100 In discussing the
requirements for conviction under Section 793 of the Espionage Act, Judge Ellis
held that “the government in this case must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendants knew the information was NDI [national defense
information], i.e., that the information was closely held by the United States and
that disclosure of this information might potentially harm the United States, and
that the persons to whom the defendants communicated the information were
not entitled under the classification regulations to receive the information.”101 In
addition, Judge Ellis imposed a “bad faith” requirement for conviction under
Section 793, finding that the United States must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendants communicated the information they had received
from their government sources with “a bad purpose either to disobey or to
disregard the law.”102 Due to the common law system used in the United States,
and, as this case is the first and last time that the United States has brought an
96

Id.; See also 18. U.S.C. §793(d) (“Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to,
control over, or being entrusted with any . . . information relating to the national
defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicates . . . the same to any person not entitled to receive it.”).
97
Neil Lewis, U.S. to Drop Spy Case Against Pro‐Israeli Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/02/us/politics/02aipac.html.
98
Robert Epstein, Comment, Balancing National Security and Free Speech: Why
Congress Should Amend the Espionage Act, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 483, 503–04
(2008).
99
Lewis, supra note 97.
100
See generally Abrams, supra note 79.
101
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (emphasis added).
102
Id (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071 (4th Cir. 1988)).
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Espionage Act prosecution against a non‐government employee, any attempt to
prosecute Assange under this Act would be required to adhere to the
aforementioned substantive requirements imposed by Judge Ellis.
2. Overcoming the “Bad Faith” Requirement
This precedent provides a difficult hurdle for the United States to
overcome in prosecuting Assange under the Espionage Act, because the United
States v. Rosen is the first attempted prosecution of non‐government employees
under the Espionage Act, and also because Judge Ellis has increased the
procedural barriers for the government in allowing for a successful prosecution
through the imposition of the intent and bad faith requirements.103 Thus, the
Department of Justice will have to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Assange and WikiLeaks wanted to do more than merely act as a media source,
proving that it was in fact known and intended for the United States to incur
harm from the publication of the NDI information on the WikiLeaks website, and
that Assange was acting with “bad faith”, or conscious disregard to the law.104
This will, in fact, be a daunting task for the Department of Justice attorneys, as
the stated intent of the WikiLeaks website is to act simply as a media outlet,
informing citizens of the activities of governments and militaries around the
world.105 To be successful, the United States will have to distinguish Assange
from a typical reporter or news outlet, and thereby classify him as a criminal
acting with the intent to harm the United States.
III. PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES TO PROSECUTION
If the United States is able to build a substantive case against Julian
Assange using the Espionage Act or another criminal statute, there are still
several remaining procedural challenges. Arguably the most significant
procedural challenge the United States will face in prosecuting Julian Assange is
the process of extradition.106 This section seeks to illuminate the challenges that
the United States may face in extraditing Assange based on his current location
and the criminal charges facing him in Sweden. This assessment is accomplished
103

Id.
Abrams, supra note 79 (“. . . But if Mr. Assange were viewed as simply following his
deeply held view that the secrets of government should be bared, not withstanding the
consequences, he might escape legal punishment”).
105
See supra, at notes 1–2.
106
Extradition is defined as, “The official surrender of an alleged criminal by one state or
nation to another having jurisdiction over the crime charged; the return of a fugitive
from justice, regardless of consent, by the authorities where the fugitive is found.”
International extradition is defined as, “Extradition in response to a demand made by
the executive of one nation on the executive of another nation. This procedure is
generally regulated by treaties.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
104

2010–2011] Government Secrets, National Security

219

through an analysis of the extradition treaty between the United States and
Sweden,107 as well as the extradition treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom.108
In December of 2010, Swedish prosecutors issued a European arrest
warrant for Assange,109 charging him with “unlawful coercion, sexual
molestation and rape”110 of two Swedish women. Therefore, Sweden is currently
seeking the extradition of Assange from the United Kingdom in order to
prosecute him for the aforementioned charges. The British court initially granted
the extradition of Assange to Sweden,111 but Assange has appealed the ruling to
the High Court in London.112 The date set for the extradition appeal is July 12,
2011.113 Currently, Assange is under electronic house arrest at the country estate
of a friend in England, with bail set at $360,000.114 In light of these
circumstances, the most foreseeable places for the United States to seek the
extradition of Julian Assange are from either Sweden (if extradition from the
United Kindgom is approved, and Sweden proceeds with the pending rape
charges against Assange) or the United Kindgom (if the United States chooses to
seek extradition before Assange is extradited to Sweden).

107

See Convention on Extradition Between the United States of America and Sweden,
U.S.‐Sw., Oct. 24, 1961. 14.2 U.S.T. 1845. See also Supplementary Convention on
Extradition Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Sweden, art. 6,
U.S.–Sw., Sept. 24, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 2501.
108
See Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and The United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.–U.K., Mar. 31, 2003, available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/treaties/treaties‐landing/records/06300/06304.
109
See John F. Burns, WikiLeaks Founder in Court to Fight Extradition Effort, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2011, at A9; See also Esther Addley, Accused or Charged? Legal Confusion for
Assange, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Dec. 18, 2010, at 4 (“Four [charges] were outlined at the
hearings: That Assange ‘unlawfully coerced’ Miss A by using his body weight to hold her
down in a sexual manner; That he ‘sexually molested’ Miss A by having sex with her
without a condom when it was her ‘express wish’ that one should be used; That he
‘deliberately molested’ Miss A ‘in a way designed to violate her sexual integrity’; That he
had sex with a second woman, Miss W, without a condom while she was sleeping.”).
110
Burns, supra note 109.
111
Karla Adam, Assange’s Extradition Ordered, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2011, at A06.
112
Assange Appeal Date, TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 7, 2011, at 18. (“Julian Assange, the
WikiLeaks founder, has been given a date for his appeal against extradition to Sweden,
where he faces allegations of sexual assault. A two‐day hearing has been listed at the
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District Judge Howard Riddle at Belmarsh Magistrates' Court in South London that
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See id.
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Adam, supra note 111.
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Assange and his legal team argue that the Swedish rape allegations
against him are “politically motivated,” and that if Assange were extradited to
Sweden, he would be at a higher risk of facing extradition to the United States.115
Assange ultimately claims that the Swedish charges are being brought solely to
aid the efforts of the United States in extraditing Assange, by creating a “holding
case,” thus providing additional time for the United States to build a criminal
case against him.116 This speculation by Assange and his legal team may stem
from Article VI of the extradition treaty between the United States and Sweden,
which provides that if the person sought for extradition is being prosecuted by
the surrendering state for an offense other than the one being requested,
extradition can be deferred until after prosecution in the surrendering
country.117 In addition, the treaty provides the option that the surrendering state
can temporarily extradite the relator for prosecution in the requesting country,
and be returned after the conclusion of the proceedings.118 Therefore, even if
Assange is being prosecuted or serving time in Sweden, the United States has the
option of deferring extradition until after his prosecution and sentencing, or of
extraditing and prosecuting him immediately, only to be returned to Sweden
after the proceedings.
A. Dual Criminality Requirement
Both the extradition treaty between the United States and Sweden as
well as the extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom
provide that in order for an offense to be extraditable, the charges must meet

115

Id.
See id.
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Article IV of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty between the U.S. and Sweden
provides: “If the extradition request is granted in the case of a person who is being
prosecuted or is serving
a sentence in the territory of the requested State for a different offense, the requested
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(a) defer the surrender of the person sought until the conclusion of the proceedings
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determined by mutual agreement of the Contracting States.” Supplementary
Convention on Extradition Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Sweden, supra note 107.
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Supplementary Convention on Extradition Between the United States of America and
the Kingdom of Sweden, supra note 107.
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the requirement of dual criminality.119 The dual criminality principle120 requires
that in order for there to be extradition, the act(s) that the relator is charged
with must be defined as criminal in both the requesting and the requested
nations.121 However, this principle is not rigid, and “does not demand that the
laws of the surrendering and requesting states be carbon copies of one
another,”122 only that the criminal laws of each country are substantially
analogous.123 If the United States chooses to prosecute Assange under the
Espionage Act, it is likely that the court will find that the dual criminality
requirement is met for both the United Kingdom and Sweden, as both countries
have laws that can be interpreted as substantially analogous to its American
counterpart.124
1. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the law which will likely be found to be
substantially analogous, and as such meeting the dual criminality requirement, is
the United Kingdom Official Secrets Act of 1989.125 Section Five of the Official
Secrets Act of 1989, titled “Information Resulting from Unauthorized Disclosures
or Entrusted in Confidence,” criminalizes the knowing, unlawful disclosure of
confidential information that in any way relates to or affects national security.126
119

Id. (“An offense shall be an extraditable offense only if it is punishable under the laws
of both Contracting States by deprivation of liberty for a period of at least two years.”);
See also Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. 2, U.S.–U.K., Mar. 31, 2003,
available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/treaties/treaties‐landing/records/06300/06304.
(“An offense shall be an extraditable offense if the conduct on which the offense is
based is punishable under the laws in both States by deprivation of liberty for a period
of one year or more or by a more severe penalty.”).
120
The dual‐criminality principle is defined as “The rule prohibiting the international
extradition of a fugitive unless the offense involves conduct that is criminal in both
countries.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ed. 2009),
121
To satisfy the dual criminality requirement, “‘the law does not require that the name
by which the crime is described in the two countries shall be the same; nor that the
scope of liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the two
countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.’”
EDWARD M. WISE, ET AL., INT. CRIM. LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 478 (LexisNexis, 3rd ed. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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Id. at 480.
123
See id.
124
“The inquiry into dual criminality requires courts to compare the law of the
surrendering state that purports to criminalize the charged conduct with the law of the
requesting state that purports to accomplish the same result. If the same conduct is
subject to criminal sanctions in both jurisdictions, no more is exigible.” Id.
125
Official Secrets Act, 1989, c. 6 (U.K.).
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Similar to the Federal Espionage Act, the Official Secrets Act includes an element
of intent for conviction, requiring that a person may only be held liable if the
disclosure was done with the reasonable knowledge that it would be
damaging.127
2. Sweden
In Sweden, Chapter Nineteen of the Swedish Penal Code, titled “Crimes
Against Security of the Realm,” has several provisions that are substantially
analogous to the Federal Espionage Act. Sections Five128 and Six129 of Chapter
Nineteen describe and establish liability for the crime of “espionage,” which is
defined as:
A person who, in order to aid a foreign power, without authorization
obtains, transmits, gives or otherwise reveals information concerning a
defense facility, arms, supplies, imports, exports, means of production,
negotiations, decisions or other conditions, the disclosure of which to a
foreign power can cause harm to the total defense of the Realm, or
otherwise to the security of the Realm.130

This definition of espionage comports with the United States definition of
espionage under the Espionage Act of 1917, which also requires an element of

protected against disclosure by the foregoing provisions of this Act if‐‐(a) it relates to
security or intelligence, defense or international relations”).
127
Id. § 3 (“A person is not held liable for the disclosure of classified information unless
(a) the disclosure by him is damaging; and (b) he makes it knowing, or having reasonable
cause to believe, that it would be damaging.”).
128
“A person who, in order to aid a foreign power, without authorisation obtains,
transmits, gives or otherwise reveals information concerning a defence facility, arms,
supplies, imports, exports, means of production, negotiations, decisions or other
conditions, the disclosure of which to a foreign power can cause harm to the total
defence of the Realm, or otherwise to the security of the Realm, shall be sentenced,
whether the information is correct or not, for espionage to imprisonment for at most six
years. This also applies if person with the intent here described, produces or takes
possession of a writing, drawing or other object containing such information without
authority.” BROTTSBALKEN [BrB] [criminal code] 19:5 (Swed.).
129
“If a crime referred to in Section 5 is regarded as gross, imprisonment for a fixed term
of at least four and at most ten years, or for life, shall be imposed for gross espionage. In
assessing whether the crime is gross, special attention shall be paid to whether the act
was of an especially dangerous nature in view of an ongoing war or concerned matters
of great importance or whether the perpetrator disclosed something entrusted to him
by reason of his position in public or private service.” BROTTSBALKEN [BrB] [criminal code]
19:6 (Swed.).
130
BROTTSBALKEN [BrB] [criminal code] 19:5 (Swed.).
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intent to aid a foreign power and/or harm the United States.131 Sections Seven
and Eight of Chapter Nineteen enumerate the crimes of “unauthorized dealing
with secret information”132 and “gross unauthorized dealing with secret
information,”133 which are similar to the crimes listed in Sections Five and Six,
just lacking the requirement of intent. The crime of “unauthorized dealing with
secret information” is defined as:
A person who, without intent to aid a foreign power, without authority
obtains, transmits, gives or reveals information concerning matters of a
secret nature, the disclosure of which to a foreign power can cause
harm to the defense of the Realm or to the maintenance of necessary
supplies to the people during war or during extraordinary conditions
caused by war, or otherwise to the security of the Realm.134

There is little doubt that a court would find that the provisions of Chapter
Nineteen are substantially analogous to the provisions of Espionage Act of 1917,
as the inquiry of the court into dual criminality is limited to determining if the
“same conduct is subject to criminal sanctions in both jurisdictions.”135 Simply
put, both Chapter Nineteen of the Swedish Penal Code and the Espionage Act of
1917 seek to punish those who release classified information to the detriment of
national security.
B. The Political Offense Exception
Both treaties also contain a potential defense for Assange if extradition
was to be requested from Sweden or Great Britain, which is known as the

131

See supra Section II (description of the Espionage Act of 1917).
“A person who, without intent to aid a foreign power, without authority obtains,
transmits, gives or reveals information concerning matters of a secret nature, the
disclosure of which to a foreign power can cause harm to the defence of the Realm or to
the maintenance of necessary supplies to the people during war or during extraordinary
conditions caused by war, or otherwise to the security of the Realm, shall be sentenced,
whether the information is correct or not, to unauthorized dealing with secret
information to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years.” BROTTSBALKEN [BrB]
[criminal code] 19:7 (Swed.).
133
“If a crime under the provisions of Section 7 is regarded as gross, imprisonment for at
most four years shall be imposed for gross unauthorised dealing with secret information.
In assessing whether the crime is gross special attention shall be paid to whether the act
involved assistance of a foreign power or was of an especially dangerous nature having
regard to an ongoing war, or related to a matter of great significance, or whether the
accused disclosed what had been confided to him by reason of public or private
service.” BROTTSBALKEN [BrB] [criminal code] 19:8 (Swed.).
134
BROTTSBALKEN [BrB] [criminal code] 19:7 (Swed.).
135
Wise, supra note 121, at 478; see also supra Section IIA.
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“political offense exception.”136 Political offenses are defined as crimes “directed
against the security or government of a nation, such as treason, sedition, or
espionage,” which, “[u]nder principles of international law, the perpetrator of a
political offense cannot be extradited.”137 The political offense exception is
based on various justifications, including: the belief that individuals have a right
to resort to political activism to incite political change, the belief that individuals
should not be returned through extradition to countries where they may be
subjected to unfair legal treatment because of their political opinions and
actions, and the belief that governments should not intervene with the political
struggles of other nations.138
1. Pure versus Relative Political Offenses
There are two categories of political offenses, “pure political offenses”139
and “relative political offenses.”140 As espionage is considered to be a “pure
political offense,” it is generally not extraditable.141 Therefore, if charged under
the Espionage Act, Assange may be able to fight extradition to the United States
by claiming that his charges are of a purely political character, and thus do not
provide for extradition.
However, the actions of Julian Assange do not seem to fall within the
scope of the general definition of “espionage,” which is defined as: “The practice
of using spies to collect information about what another government or
company is doing or plans to do.”142 If, based on this traditional definition of
espionage, the reviewing court feels that the crime(s) that Assange is being
charged with is not a “pure political offense” but instead may be a “relative
political offense,” then the court has more discretion to determine whether or
not the specific charges are extraditable, through the determination of whether
136

Convention on Extradition Between the United States of America and Sweden, supra
note 107, at art. 5 (“Extradition shall not be granted in any of the following
circumstances: (5) If the offense is regarded by the requested State as a political offense
or as an offense connected with a political offense”); Extradition Treaty Between the
United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
supra note 108, at art. 4 (“Extradition shall not be granted if the offense for which
extradition is requested is a political offense.”).
137
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
138
Wise, supra note 121, at 516.
139
Pure political offenses include acts aimed directly at the government, which include
treason, sedition, and espionage. Id.
140
Relative political offenses include “otherwise common crimes committed in
connection with a political act” or “common crimes committed for political motives or in
a political context.” Id. at 517.
141
Id. at 516.
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the offense is a relative political offense. “Relative political offenses” are ones
that may be politically motivated or in connection with a political act, but are not
aimed directly at the government.143
2. The Incidence Test
In determining whether an offense is a relative political offense, Anglo‐
American courts use what is known as the “Incidence Test.”144 The Incidence
Test protects relative political offenses that are found to be “incidental to” a
“political uprising.”145 For the purposes of the incidence test, an “uprising” refers
to “a people rising up, in their own land, against the government of that land.”146
Clearly, the actions of Julian Assange do not warrant protection as a relative
political offense under the American Incidence Test, as the global publication of
classified national security information is not incidental to an uprising of people
against their own government.147 Therefore, if the reviewing court determines
that the charge(s) against Assange do(es) not constitute a pure political offense,
then it may be found, through the American Incidence Test, that the offense is
not worthy of protection as a relative political offense, and thereby extraditable.
Although there may be some conceivable way around this successful assertion of
the political offense exception by Assange, overall, this principle provides a
significant barrier for the United States in successfully extraditing Assange from
Sweden or the United Kingdom, and is a foreseeable point of contention in
future legal proceedings. This exception alone may be sufficient to deter the
United States from seeking to prosecute Assange under the Espionage Act of
1917.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Department of Justice will face significant substantive and procedural
barriers in its attempt to criminally prosecute Julian Assange. The two most
143

See Wise, supra note 121, at 516–17.
In addition to the Anglo‐American “Incidence Test”, courts also use the French
“objective” test and the Swiss “proportionality” test to determine if an offense
constitutes a relative political offense. Wise, supra note 121, at 517 (quoting Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Incidence Test was used as a point of
analysis as the United States is one of the hypothetical parties to the Assange
extradition, as well as the fact that the United Kingdom often utilizes the Incidence Test.
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Wise, supra note 121, at 516–25 (quoting Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.
1986)).
146
Id. at 525.
147
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similar prosecutions, the Pentagon Papers case and United States v. Rosen, were
both dismissed before a conviction was made. As such, these cases do not supply
binding precedent—only amorphous theoretical and legal guidance. Additionally,
regardless of the criminal theory that is used by the United States to prosecute
Assange, the procedural barrier of extradition remains considerable, especially
with the potential defense of the political offense exception remaining.
Although there is great uncertainty as to which criminal theory the
United States will use to prosecute Assange, it is clear that Congress will need to
establish new policies that address the global dissemination of classified national
security information through the World Wide Web. Ulimately, the future of a
Wikileaks prosecution is shrouded in uncertainty. The only thing that remains
certain today is that with the prosecution of Julian Assange, the United States
will be establishing new legal territory.

